steady state, and with our definition of equilibrium, a unique equilibrium path. Bond and Samuelson (1984) show by example that if the durable good depreciates and the monopolist's period of commitment is infinitesimal. then the competitive equilibrium constitutes a Strong Markov Perfect Equilibrium (SMPE). The modifier "Strong Markov" means that all agents condition their current actions and/or their beliefs about the future on only the current state variable, which in this case is the stock of the durable good. "Perfect" means that the continuation of the original strategies and/or beliefs constitute an equilibrium even if the state has departed from its equilibrium trajectory (following, for example, a deviation by some agent in the past or a random shock). However, their ailalysis may (incorrectly) suggest that the competitive equilibrium is the only SMPE for their example.
Our simpler and more general approach allows us to demonstrate the existence of, a~td to characterize, a continuum of SMPE.
There are at least three reasons why eeonornists have been interested in the Coase Conjecture. First, the Conjecture has important welfare implications in markets where monopolists produce durable goods. Second, tile durable goods rnonopoly model provides a useful analogy for situations where a strategic agent is constrai~led by the beliefs of nonstrategic agents who have rational expectations. (For example, the Conjecture improves our intuition about why, in some circumstances, a government that cannot make coininitrnents about the future has limited ability to influence private agents.) Iliird, there is a close parallel 'between certain bargaining problems atid the tlurable goods xiioiiopoly. Fudenberg and Trole's (1993) text on game theory studies tlre Cease Cocjecriii-e exclusiveiy in tile context of a bargaining problem. Our extension of the diirable goods manopoiy siioultl interest economists who care about the Conjecture for the first two reasons. We have not, however, discovered the bargaining analog of the durable goods model with depreciation.'
The next two sections present the model and characterize the set of SMPE. The following section discusses the result in relation to existing literature. The conclusion provides a summary.
The Model and Basic Result
The usual procedure in modelling the durable goods monopolist begins with a discrete stage problem, in which the monopolist's period of commitment is E > 0 , aud then studies the limiting form as E -+ 0. In the interests of simpiicity, and because we care only about the problem with an infinitesimal period of commitment, we begin with a continuous time model.
The reader can easily verify that our basic equilibrium conditions, equations (2) and (43 below, are the limiting form of the equilibrium conditions to the discrete stage model.
We proceed in three steps to obtain the rion-uniqueness resuit. First, we use uynam~c programming to construct a family of candidate SMPE. We then note that for each member of this family, the candidate is pateiltly "unreasonable" over an internal of state space. so we modify the candidate to overcome this objection. This modification does not eliminate any steady state level of output; in particular, it includes the steady state of the inonopolist who can precommit. Finally, we verify (ha: the monopolist has no incentive to deviate from the We think that it is likeiy that there is an niuxiogy waiting ict be discovered. Olseri (1992) shows that when the standard Coasian model is extencieii LO iiiclude le;rn.iing by doing, there is a parallel inlevretation as a bargaining problem. Illis kind of result, in addition to tile literiture surveyed in Fudenberg and Tirole, suggests d~ar rilere may also be a bargaining interpretation to the durable goods modei with depreciation.
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(modified) candidate, so that it does represent a SMPE. This is itated as Proposition 1.
The stock of the durable good at t is Q,, the rate of production is q,, and the stock depreciates at constant rate 6 2 0. We suppress time subscripts where convenient. The equation of motion for Q is 0 = q -6 Q .
(1)
The inverse demand for services (the implicit rental rate) is F(Q),~ which is exogenous. The interest rate common to all agents is r. Tlte equilibrium price for a unit of the durable good at t must satisfy so that in equilibrium buyers' beliefs about tile value of a unit of the good are confinned.
The constant average cost of production is c.
We assume that F(Q) is strictly decreasing and continuous over ine iiiierval 10, Q,], where Qo solves F(Q,) = (r+S)c; Q, is the steady state that equates price and marginal cost, i.e. the competitive steady state. This assumption corresponds to the ":lo-gap" case in the standard (no depreciation) durable goods monopoly proble~n. Tile term "no-gap" refers to the fact that there is no gap between the cost of production and the reservation price of the buyer with the lowest valuation which is no less than the cost of prodi~ction. The assumption simplifies the exposition. and we also consider it rinpiricaily !-easonablc. W e describe the We have in mind ihe case where the durable good is a prciciiicer good, so that F(Q) is ihe value of the marginal product of a m~chine. Of course the rnodei is also appropriate for the case of consumer drrrable goods. i alternative "gap" case, and we discuss how this alters our results, in Appendix B. Fudenberg and Tiole, chapter 10, discuss the "no-gap" and "gap" distinction for the standard durable goods model.
To obtain a SMPE we need to find a function P(Q) such that when the monopolist solves the control problem subject to (I) with Q given, equation (2) is satisfied."n this section we restrict attention to continuous functions P(Q). The reason for this resmction is discussed in a followiitg section
We will occasionally refer to the function P ( Q as an equilibrium, by which we mean that there are equilibrium beliefs by buyers and equilibrium behavior by the monopoiisr that
We show that there exists a family of such functions, one member of which is the trivial function P(Q) = c, which corresponds to the competitive equilibrium. (The reason for If this claim is not obvious, the reader should write down the discrete stage version of (1) and (2), denoting E as the period of commitment, and q ,~ as the amount produced and sold at the beginning of period t. Denote the equilibrium price function, induced by the buyers' expectations of the monopolist's future sales strategy as P(Q,,;e).
If the stock at the beginninn of period t ( A = is Q and sales in that period are q ,~, buyers are willing to pay F(Q,+~,E)
. T h i s expression reveals that the monopolist's ability to affect the current price by choosing q,, given that the function P(.) depends on @riur-e sales. is of the same order of magnitude as E. Therefore as E -+ 0 the monopolist takes the cunent price as given. and solver the conrral problem (3). Tuis does not necessarily irnply that the inonopoiist reproduces the competitive equilibrium. The competitive seller takes the price zrujectiiry as given. The monopolist with a 0 period of commitment takes the pricejilrtclioti as given: when this is a nontrivial function of Q, the monopolist is able to affect the price trajectory iildi~.ectly by convolling Q. 6 using the superscript 0 to denote the cornpetirive outcome will become clear in a moment.)
In this case the monopolist can do no better than to produce in the first instant the quantity Q (defined above) which solves F(Q) = (ri-6)c: thereafter the monopolist produces at the rate 6Q, and maintains the competitive steady state. Other SMPE may involve slower adjustment to the steady state, tower steady state levels of production, and positive monopoly profits.
We construct a candidate SMPE using dynamic programming. Define J(Q) as the value of the monopolist's program when the existing stock is Q. 'The dynamic programming equation for the monopolist's problem is
In order for the monopolist to be wiiiing to produce at a positive, finite rate, the term that multiplies q in (4) must vanish:
This implies
The parameter k is an arbitrary constant of integration. The diffei.enttial eqnarion in (6) shows the importance of 6. For 6 = 0, this equation implies that J(Q) = 0, which implies that P(QJ = PO, whenever the monopolist is producing at a positive tinite rate.
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Differentiating J(Q) given in (6) and substituting tile resuit into 35) implies that the equilibrium price function, indexed by k, is
For k=O, the monopolist reproduces the competitive equilibrium, even when 6 > 0. This is consistent with Bond and Samuelson's (1984) result that there is a SMPE that reproduces the competitive outcome when the durable good depreciates and the period of commitment is infinitesimal.
We now calculate a control rule, q k (~) , that supports the price P~Q ) and satisfies (2) on the interval [O,Q] .
(For Q > Qo competitive sellers would set q = 0, as would the monopolist.) We substitute pk for P in the differential equation in (2), and equate the result to the time derivative of Pk. Rearranging this yields the control iule This verifies that the non-negativity constraint on production is satisfied over [O.Q] .
Step By construction, the price function @ and associated control iule q%e consistent, in that they satisfy the monopolist's first order condiiion and in equilibrium tile consumers' expectations are born out. By definition the equiiibriunl is Strong Slarkov: the control rule, given by @), depends only on the stock of the good. and since the price function also depends only on the stock, so musi the buyers' especr~rians whiuii induce rirat function.
Moreover, the equilibrium is Perfect: any past deviation or random shock which causes tfie 8 state to leave its equilibrium trajectory does not alter the monopolist's control problem, so (8) remains an equilibrium sates rule and (7) an equilibrium price fsnction.
However, other considerations imply that there is an upper bound on k; and even if k is below that bound, there is a region of state space (an interval of Q), which depends on the value of k, for which the candidate proposed above is unreasonable. To explain these points we concentrate on a particular class of rental functions, F(Q, defined by Assumption 1, below. This restriction is made only to simplify exposition, since it makes it unnecessary to consider many special cases. As we point out below, the restriction is not necessary to obtain our chief results.
Definition 1: The parameter k, is a value of k such that pk is tangent to W(r+6), and Q , is the value of Q at the tangency.. Assumotion 1: There is a unique value for k, and Q,.' For k < k,. pk 311d F/(r+8) intersect
at exactly two points. For k > k,. P lies above Fi(r+G).* Figure 1 graphs F(Q)/(r+G) for linear F, and shows the graphs of pk for four values of
Larger values, such as kz in Figure 1 , imply that for all values of Q price is greater than Fl(r+G), which by (2) implies that P is rising. The arrows on the curve labelled k2 illustrate this. Then, by (7j, P becomes unbounded. In this equilibrium agents always buy the durable good because of the expectation of future capital gains. This "Ponzi equilibrium" is consistent with the model, but it seems unreasonable, and we rule it out by requiring that k < k.
Even for k i k,, the candidate equilibrium prescribes rhat price becomes unbounded if the initial value of Q is sufficiently small. The curve labelled k, in Figure 1 illustrates this. (rt8) and, as the arrows indicate, price rises. The point Q; is an unstdble stcady stare, and Q, is a stable steady state. When k = k,, for any value of Q < Q;, price rises and the stock falls.
This leads to another Ponzi equilibrium. To avoid this outconle we construct a modified candidate price function as follows: For any 0 . : k < k,, define the points (Q;, Pi) and (Q,, P,) as, respectively the smallest (minimum Qj and the largest intersection of the curves P"
and F/(r+G). Take fQi, Pi) as a point on the curve p, with Qc in tile interval [Q;, Q,] .
The tangency point Q, solves h(Qj = g(Q). ,where
there is associated a itiiique k.. Therefilvs ( 1 , and k. are unique iff there is a unique solution to h(Q) = g(Q).
Define the modified candidate for the price function as
The modification flattens the original candidate at a point in the interval [Qi, Qk] .An example of this function is shown in Figure 1 . The graph of the modified price function ijk f o r k = kl is the horizontal line at P;', and the part of the curve labelled k, below this line.
The sates rule that supports this candidate is
The expression ilk = p . means that sales rate is infinite for an instant, causing the stock to jump to Q'i. For given k < k, there ace a continuurn of 9" which depend on the choice of (Qi, ) That is, depends on the height at which we tlatten the original function P ! To avoid excessive notation, we do not make this depenciencc explicit. However, it is impol-rant to note that vie cannot choose (Qi, Pi) strictly above [to the left) of (Q,, P~c). Tlie reason can be seen by examining the horizontal line that intersects the curve ki at point A in Figure 1 The modification expressed by (9) and (10) eliminates the Ponzi features of the original candidate equilibrium, and it retains consistency.
Finally, we verify that the modified candidate given by (9) and (10) is an equilibrium. The discussion thus far has used only the first order condition of the monopolist's problem, equation (3, the buyers' rational expectations constraint, given by (2), 4 the elimination of Ponzi equilibria. Because of the linearity of the monopolist's control problem, the first order condition is not sufficient for a maximum. Our final step is to show that the monopolist would have no incentive to deviate from the proposed equilibrium. Once this is done, we have the basic result of this section, which wt : smte as Proposition I: Suppose that F is continuous, k is chosen so that P' intersects F/(r+G), and Qi is chosen to lie in an interval over which P%S nor above F/(r+G). in this case, the price function (9) and the sales rule (10) We think that stabiiity is a reasonable requireirreiit, for es5eniiaiiy tihe same reasons riiar we regard equilibria supported by punishment strategies as unreasonable iii tiiis coiitexr. We return to this issue in the next section. See also note 11. likely to occur if consumers' discount rate is higher than rlie monopolist's.
It is also apparent that if stability is viewed as a reasonable property for equilibria, the monopolist has an incentive to buiid-in obso:escence. This incentive is absent for the competitive firm or the monopolist who can precommit. This point has been recognized previously [e.g. Bnlow (1986) and Bond and Samuelson (1984) l for particular SMPE, but it also holds for a much more general class.
For example, if F = 1 -Q, the steady state under competition is Q, = 1 -(r+6jc, and the steady state under the monopolist who can make binding commitments is Q,,, = QJ2.
The smallest stable SMPE steady state is Q, = (r i G)Qd(r + 2 8 . As r -+ 0 he inability to make commitments results in negligible loss to the monopolist. if c = 0, so that Q, is independent of 6, then as 6 -+ w, the inability to make cornnlitments again results in negligible loss to tile monopolist. However as 6 i 0, monopoiy profits are 0.' Since profits are 0 for 6 = 0 and can be positive when 6 > 0, potential profits are ceriainly increasing for small 6: the monopolist has an incentive to build-in obsolescence. When c = 0 it is easy to show that maximal profits (i.e., profiu: under the monopolist's preferred SMPE) are monotonically increasing in 6, so the monopolist would like to set 8 = -. For positive c, it must be the case that (1-rc)/c > 6 in order for it to be profiiable to prodiice the good at all; thus when production costs are positive the monopolist's optima1 level of 6 is positive and finite. The optimal level of 6 is 0 for the monopolist who can pre-coin:ilii and for tlle social pianner, when c > 0.
~~
The elimination of Ponzi equilibria means that under lissui~iprior: 1 the set of stable steady states of SMPE is continuous in 6, even (it 6 = 0. ii'r can make every point in this set arbitrarily close to the competitive equilibrium by choosing 8 sufficiently ciose to 0.
Relation to Previous Work
Our major contribution has been t!le construction and characterization of a class of SMPE for the durable goods monopolist with an infinitesimal period of commitment. We have shown that when the good depreciates, the equilibrium is not unique and the Coase Conjecture need not hold. In this section we discuss the relation between our result and existing literature.
It is widely recognized that if agents' beliefs are discontinuous in the variable(s) upon which they are conditioned, equilibria are likely to be non-unique: this is the basis for the Folk Theorem of repeated games, and similar results hold in dynamic games. Stokey (1981) demonstrdted an analogous result for the durable foods monopolist. Ausubel and Deneckere modeled the problem as a game among a monopolist and a continuum of buyers, and also showed that there were many equilibria. Using a discrete time model, they showed that there always exists a Weak Markov Perfect Equilibrium (WMPE). As the period of commirrnent diminishes, monopoly profits under this WMPE approach 0. f\ sketch of tiitir argulnent is as follows: Under an alternate trajectory, in the first period the monopolist sells ilearly the firstbest level, %, , , , and thereafter increases the stock very slowly. Total profits can be made close to the first-best level, and continuation profits. from any stock level, are always strictly positive. If the monopolist deviates from this aiternaie trajectory. buyers believe lie will subsequently follow the WMPE. This "punishment" can be iised to support profits arbitrxily close to the first-best level, if the period of cornmitinent is s~!ificier?tIj: small, Band and Sarnuelscn (1987) consider rhe case or' a iiul.able gooil that tiepi-eciares.
They show that there are multiple eqiiilibria and steady states, ii~cliiding illat of tile precomrnitted monopolist. We provide the gist of their argument, using our notation (and continuous time). If the initial stock Q is less than or equal to Q,, (for example), the monopolist immediately sells the discrete amount Q p , -Q and thereafter maintains that level by selling at rate wpm. This is the first-best trajectory (at time O), and on it the monopolist e m s positive profits at every point in time. If he ever deviates by selling more than 6Qp,, this drives the stock above Q,,. Thereafter buyers believe that P E c and the monopolist e m s 0 profits. Since P E c is an equilibrium, this is a "credible threat" and it deters the monopolist from deviating from the first-best trajectory.
Note that although in this case the threat is a SMPE, the equilibrium is conditioned on histories, and is not Markov. If one were to (mistakenly) interpret this equilibrium as Markov, and graph P as a function of Q, the result might be9 a step function, with steps at F(&,)/(r+6) and c, and the discontinuity at Qp,. However, this graph does not represent a Markov equilibrium function. To understand why, suppose to tlie contraxy that tire step functioil jast described did represent a discontinuous frlurkov equilibrium. 111 that case, if the stock were ever at &,+E, for E > 0, the equilibrium prescribes that tlie monopolist immediately sells the competitive amoilnt and e m s zero profits. However, by deviating from this path and setting q = 0 until the stock decays to Q,,,, and thereacter selling at rate iiQpn,, the monopolist earns positive profits. The monopolist wouid obviously want to deviate.
We include this discussion as a response to one rcader who clai~ned that Bond and Smuelson (1987) had shown ihat discontinuous /bfurkov price functions cai~id support multiple equilibria. This reader drew their equilibria as the step function described above. Since the quilibrium is conditioned on history as we11 as current Q, there are many (misleading) ways that one might graph P as a function of only Q. The cor~fusion :nay have been due to the fact ihat Bond and Samuelson described the equilibrium they proposed as "nonsiationary", and said nothing about it being history dependent.
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making the buyers'belief that P = c for Q > Qp, incorrect. This belief can therefore not serve as a punishment that supports the first-best traje~tory.'~ In order for the "threat" to serve as a credible punishment it must be the case that buyers believe that P 2 c if Q 2 Q,,,, or i f Q had ever exceeded Qp, in the past. This is why the equilibrium proposed by Bond and Samuelson is history dependent. The same argument applies to any discontinuous function that is used to support a steady state equilibrium at the point of discontinuity. This does not necessarily mean that all SMPE are continuous, but it does preclude the possibility of using discontinuity as a means of "sneaking punishments in the back door". This explains why, in previous sections, we have restricted attention to beliefs which induce continuous functions P(Q).
Thus, both Ausubel and Deneckere and Bond and Samuelson obtain nou-uniqueness by using a Folk-theorem type argument which relies on credible punishments. The equilibria they propose are not Markov. Our approach, in contrast, shows that even with the restriction to strong Markov behavior, equiiibria are not unique. Although punishment strategies have an obvious appeal in games with a few players, they are less plausible in situations with a continuum of agents. It is harder to believe that a continuum of buyers would all dramatically revise their beliefs about the future in the event that the seller deviates by even a small amount from a proposed equilibria." Markov equiiibriz seein inore reasonable in a ' ' This point may not be obvious, because readers Lire acciistomed to tiiscontinuous Mxkov perfect strategies in noncooperative dynamic games. Dutta and Sundararn (1993) provide an example and Karp and Ne-mbery (1993, pg 888) iiiicuss the general issue.
' Our scepticism regarding the plausibility of punishment strategies is based on the Fact that they invoive discontinuous -and typically large -changes in beliefs and strategies foilowing small deviations from equilibrium behavior. We make a ciistii-iction between rlie coordination There is another paper which has a close technical relation to our paper, although the economic context is very different. Tsutsui and Mino (1990) expiain why there may be a continuum of differentiable SMPE in a noncooperative differential game. They ascribe the non-uniqueness to an "incomplete transversality condition". There is another way of expressing this. The first order conditions of M;lrkov equilibria (in games or control problems with a single state variable) can often be used to obtain ordinruy differential equations (ODE'S) that characterize the equilibrium. For example, above we obtained an ODE for the value function in (6). In many cases, however, there is no "naturai boundary condition" for this ODE, and therefore no way to pin down the equilibrium. If, for example, we were told that the steady state stock was some number a, we could evaluate the flow of profits at this level, n,, and thereby obtain the boundary condition for (6), J(Q,) = nJr.
However, the steady state is endogenous, and in general the Markov assumption is not restrictive enough to lead to a unique valiie. When 6 = 0 tlierc is a natural bound;11'y condition: the competitive stock level. If the good never depreciates, the monopolist must eventually produce the competitive level; stopping production [and profits) wlien some problem, which arises whenever there are nlultiple cqiiilibi-i:i (;is ii? our model, or witn punishment strategies), and :he fragility (or complexity) of beliefs (which is required for punishment strategies, but not in our model). This was also the basis for tile stability requirement of the previous section. If we did not require stability, we saw tliat u sinall change in behavior, which changed the level of the stock, would lead to a large ciiange in ilie equilibriuin outcome. 19 demand is unsatisfied, could not be part of a Ilarkov equilibrium. This Pact leads to a terminat condition on the state variable, and this provides the missing boundary condition to the ODE.
The importance of this observation extends beyond the model studied here. For example, if depreciation were introduced into Kahn's model, the SMPE would no longer be unique. The multiplicity of SMPE (in the durable goods monopoly model) has been overlooked because in the past people have studied the equilibrium of the infinite horizon game by taking the limit, as the horizon goes to infinity, of the finite horizon model. For the finite horizon model there is obviously a terminal condition on the monopolist's value function. Tbis condition is a boundary condition that pins down the equilibrium. Using :he inductive argument found in Bond and Samuelson (1984) , we see that there is a unique equilibrium to every finite horizon game (at least in the Iitlear case), and the unique limiti2 (as the horizon approaches infinity and the period of com~nitinent approaches O j of this sequence of equilibria satisfies the Coase Conjecture. We have shown that solving the iirodel backwards from the terminal period, and then raking limits, identifies oi~ly oire of a continuum of equilibria of the infinite horizon ganle.
The relation between the limiting equilibi'iuin of tile finite lloi'izoi~ model. and a particular equilibrium in the infinite horizon modei, lids receiii!y been studied by Drisitiii (1994) . He adds depreciation to Kahn's lineer-ijuadratic infinite hril.izon model and solves for the linear-quariraiic SMPE (linear price functiotl and control rule and quadratic value " Given the terminal condition implied by the final period, tile tiiffereirce equations which determine the parameters of the lineru-quadratic equiiibritim, converge to a iirriyue iiinit. function). He compares this to the equilibriunl of the corresponding finite-horizon model, and demonsmtes a "turnpike propeny": The equilibrium paths of the infinite horizon and the finite horizon models can be made arbitrarily close over an arbitrarily long finite interval. by choosing the horizon sufficiently large.
Conclusion
Introducing depreciation into the durable goods inonopoly model causes the Coase Conjecture to fail. Even if production costs are constant, and agents condition their current actions and their beliefs about all agents' future actions on only the state variable, there is no reason to suppose that the monopolist will reproduce the competitive equilibrium when his period of commitment is 0. Previous results which appear to suggest that depreciation does not weaken the Coase Conjecture, identified a particular Markov equilibriutn. This is equivalent to assuming a particular boundary condirion. In general, however, there is 110 natural boundary condition to the monopolist's problem, and thus there exists a continuum of SMPE.
Previous results which show that the outcoirle predicted by the Coase Conjecture is only one of many possible outcomes, all relied on non-Makov equilibria. The intent of these models was to show that the Conjecture was tinlikely to tlescribe reality. flowever, exactly the opposite conclusion could be drawn if one regards non-Markov behavior as iinplausible in markets with a continuum o f agents. That is. it rnay have appelired tiia: non-l/liu.kov betiaviar was necessury to overturn the Conjecture. We have iho*.vn that even in a klarhov equilibrium, the Conjecture need not hold. In order to make use of a sin~ple proof (based on Clark, pp 53 -5 3 , we will coinpare the proposed equilibrium Qjt) with defections that eventually reach Q(t). To this end, we define a modified defection, ~~~( t ) as follows: For arbitrary T and arbitrary defection Qd(t), Qd"it) E ~~( t )
over [O,T) ; at T Q*' begins a Most Rapid Approach Path (MRAP) to Q, and after reaching it, ~~' ( t ) f Q(t). (For tile example in the figure. Qd(T) < Q(T), so the MRAP is a vertical line, and Qd' = Q for all. t > T; the argu~nent rhat folioivs uses this fact, and needs to be modified in an obvious way for defections :hat lie above Q at T.) Define ji" as tile monopolist's payoff under the modified defection. Since r!~e flow of tnoi~opuly profits is bounded and r 9 0, it is obvious that lim,,-,-jtrr --J C: . ,F r 11e iiiersase in the :~~onopolisi's payoff due to the defection is 
